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Discussan~ Cammen~s
Robert E. Litan*
Given my recent change in jobs, I am compelled to begin with a
disclaimer that is stronger than usual. What I am about to say represents
my personal views only and not those of the Clinton Administration or the
Justice Department. And even with this disclaimer, I may get in trouble.
In addressing the issues discussed by these papers today, I feel a
little like the man in the story who simply refers to his jokes by their
numbers, and because everyone has heard them so often, they are
expected to laugh. The same is true for all of you and the ideas for
changes in bank structure. You have heard them all before: narrow
banking is number 1, of course; universal banking, number 2; financial
holding company, number 3, and so on. We could quit right now and
take a vote on which number you would prefer; I even think I could
guess the outcome.
So what is really new about the discussion we are having today?
Well, one new thing is that I am not part of the game any more. At least
temporarily, I have taken a time-out to worry about antitrust issues in
the economy and will spend only a small part of my time worrying about
banking. But while you will not have me to kick around any longer
about narrow banking, you now have Jim Pierce. The idea has not gone
away.
The second thing that appears to be new is that nothing is likely to
happen on the legislative horizon in the United States to alter bank
structure much, at least not for the next three years. If we had held this
conference back in 1991, we would have been debating the far-reaching
financial holding company concept proposed by the Bush Treasury. But
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that effort failed, as we all know. And now the Clinton Treasury has
announced that this session it will support only a modest interstate
branching bill, one that would "Douglasize" the McFadden Act but
would not address the so-called "bank powers" issues. At least not now.1
The Proposals for Change
Today we are left to consider how not to repeat the 1980s; that is,
how not to let the rate of bank and thrift failures get nearly out of hand.
This seems like a mundane assignment, but the diversity of views
represented in our papers suggests that it is more challenging than it
might first appear.
Safeguarding Banks from Financial Cycles
Richard Randall begins by reminding us what went wrong in the
1980s that led to so many thrift and bank failures. His basic theme is that
regulators failed to prevent excessive concentration of risks in time.
Whether it was lending to less developed countries, leveraged buyout
lending, or commercial real estate, banks and thrifts got carried away
and when exogenous events turned sour or, in Randall’s terminology,
financial cycles hit with hurricane force, banks and thrifts were too
exposed and many got washed away.
Randall suggests that the challenge for the future is to prevent such
excessive concentration of risk-taking againmfor future financial hurri-
canes will surely occur, He asks the fundamental question, are we going
to rely on the market to do that, or are we going to rely on the
regulators? Now in asking that question, Randall has implicitly ruled out
an alternative approach for dealing with future financial hurricanes,
namely more insurance or, equivalent in the banking context, higher
capital standards. In fact, if we go toward the road of greater market
discipline, in essence we would get higher capital, at least for those
institutions that concentrate their risk-taking.
But Randall is skeptical of greater market discipline for a different
reason: in his opinion, market participantsmdepositors, shareholders,
and creditors--have not proved able to forecast as well as regulators. An
example, by the way, that would have supported Randall’s case, one
that I am surprised he did not mention, is that in the quarter before Bank
of New England failed, the shareholders of Bank of New England were
buying its stock. I mean insiders, the management, were buying the
1 Since these remarks were made, the outlook for congressional passage of an
interstate branching bill before the end of the 1994 session has brightened considerably.DISCUSSANT COMMENTS 133
stock. Even the insiders did not know the bank was failing, whether
because they were ill-informed or because they were unable to forecast
as well as the regulators.
Market Discipline and Higher Levels of Capital
George Benston contests Randall’s view about market discipline.
But whether he or Randall is correct about the ability of market
participants to warn of future danger has nothing to do with the
demands that market participants almost certainly would make, in a
world where deposit insurance was less generous, for depositories to
have more capital than they have now. And precisely because they
would have more capital, they would be less prone to failure.
For proof, you need simply look to the 1980s. Compare the handful
of finance companies that failed with the thousands of banks and thrifts
that failed. It is true that one large finance company, Westinghouse, had
problems and has appeared to survive only on the strength of its
well-capitalized parent. But this example only demonstrates how impor-
tant it is that lending activity be backed by capital somewhere in an
organization. And Westinghouse’s creditors would not have continued
doing business with the finance company, had the entire organization
not been adequately capitalized. Without question, if we move in the direc-
tion of market discipline we get more capital. What is wrong with that?
In short, even if market participants could not discipline deposito-
ries against excessive concentration of risk more effectively than regu-
lators, the experience of the 1980s suggests that a stronger dose of
market discipline could be useful in inducing depositories to be better
capitalized. And all this would occur without regulators forcing banks to
increase their capital.
The only possible objection to stronger capitalization for deposito-
ries is that it would raise the cost of lending and thus constrain economic
growth. I am not sure I agree with this objection, for several reasons.
First, as Benston has pointed out, if higher capital comes in the form of
subordinated debt, with tax-deductible interest payments, any increase
in capital costs will be mitigated. Second, as Fed research has discov-
ered, more strongly capitalized banks tend to have lower deposit
interest costs. So, it is not clear that higher capital is necessarily
associated with a cost penalty. And even if higher capitalization raised
lending rates, that increase would come about only because some
portion of the current deposit insurance subsidy would have been
removed. The result would be a more rational allocation of capital.
Nevertheless, Randall has a point when he states that regulators
could do a better job in the future of warning banks of the dangers of
excessively concentrating their risks, whether in particular types of
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that these warnings are best conveyed on a case-by-case, judgmental
basis rather than on the basis of any hard-and-fast rules. In addition,
alarm bells should go off when a bank expands its risks in any one area
very rapidly.
Dangers of Exclusive Reliance on Regulation
I see no harm in the regulators trying, at least at the margin, to
dissuade banks from going over the edge. But I believe it would be a big
mistake to rely exclusively on better supervision to prevent the dangers
of future bank problems. Just as financial cycles have contributed to
bank failures, political cycles have deeply affected bank and thrift
regulation in the past and inevitably will do so in the future. We just
came through a political cycle where things were too lax. Politicians got
upset and told the regulators they were too lenient, so they came down
hard on banks. When the regulators tightened up, the politicians got
upset because the regulators were too tough.
Randall tells us that regulators should be trusted to take the punch
bowl away when the party gets going, and that may happen. But you
can bet that when they do so, they will be criticized by many in
Congress and perhaps by officials in the executive branch for dampen-
ing the recovery. Similarly, when banks start dropping, regulators will
be excoriated for being too lax. You cannot just assume that regulators
are going to be immune to this political pressure. This leads to a case for
having more market discipline, because you cannot believe the regula-
tors are going to be as perfect as you would wish.
Coinsurance
So, a strong case remains for injecting more market discipline. The
three papers give us three options. Rolnick argues for protection for
depositors through coinsurance. The problem here is a familiar one,
namely, that any coinsurance plan entails the risk of runs. Whether one
wants to accept this risk becomes something of a question of faith. My
religion tells me that this is a risk that policymakers may°be able to
tolerate in the case of small banks, but it is simply not realistic in the case
of large banks.
I know the familiar arguments: that a run is not a problem as long
as depositors put their money back into some bank, and that the Federal
Reserve can stop any systemic run by lending freely. The problem is that
the Federal Reserve would not be enthusiastic about having to lend, if it
were forced to do so, to hundreds of banks facing a potential run.
Private sector participants may discount the worst case. For public
policymakers, it is the other way around: The worst case is what scares
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inevitably will tend to give more weight to the risk of worst case losses
than may be justified. Therefore, I do not think that coinsurance for
large banks is at all credible. In sum, relying on depositor discipline
when the crunch really comes is like being willing to jump over an
abyss; you might succeed, but you are understandably unwilling to take
the leap. At least I am, and I suspect most Fed officials are too, in the real
world.
Subordinated Debt
A second source of discipline, favored by Benston, is subordinated
debt. In my view, this option clearly dominates depositor discipline
because subordinated debt holders cannot run until their instruments
mature. Facing a huge potential loss and a modest upside gain,
subordinated debt holders are going to exercise a rather conservative
influence on the bank. In fact, this option makes so much sense that I
cannot understand why our regulators do not require all large banks, or
at least those with access to the capital markets, to maintain some
portion of their Tier II capital in the form of subordinated debt. It should
be mandatory for large banks. I would not worry about the small banks,
which may not be able to sell subordinated debt.
Randall may be right that subordinated debt holders are not better
monitors than the regulators. But he may be wrong as well, especially as
banks are forced to disclose their assets and liabilities on a marked-to-
market basis. If the Basle Accord is the only thing holding us back from
imposing a subordinated debt requirement, then we ought to go ahead
and do this now, alone.
Narrow Banking
This brings me to the third market-based alternative, which is
narrow banking, or monetary service companies, if you will. Now, some
may question this characterization but, in fact, narrow banking is the
ultimate market solution to the banking problem, since it would require
all lending to be supported by uninsured funds and thus to a market
test. In effect, this option would totally remove the deposit insurance
subsidy from lending. In addition, narrow banking would remove
supervision of lending and put it in the market and, in the process,
remove the political cycle problem from the lending process. We take
away the bank supervisors and let the market do their work for us.
I know there are objections to narrow banking and without bela-
boring them, I think Pierce handles them. The big objection to narrow
banking is the one that Pierce talks about, the Chicken Little problem.
What are you going to do about the potential risk of a run in the
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monetary service company world? This is an easy thing to answer.
Suppose you have a run on, say, "Chase Manhattan Financial" in the
narrow bank world; in my opinion, no obvious justification exists for
bailing out the uninsured creditors of this hypothetical outfit. The
question is, will the run spread to other commercial paper holders in
other well-financed or well-capitalized companies? If you are worried
about that, the Fed has a very easy solution. It can use open market
operations it has always used, to drive down the T-bill rate and widen
up a gap between T-bills and commercial paper rates; then people will
come back and buy commercial paper of other well-financed companies.
The Fed does not have to bail out anybody’s creditors. All it has to do is
engage in generalized liquidity support of the kind that it practices all
the time.
Two more political objections, however, stand between narrow
banking and reality: First, what to do about Community Reinvestment
Act requirements? These could be imposed on the holding company,
but would still be a problem. Also, the adjustment costs of a shift to
narrow banking would be large, and I would therefore implement any
narrow banking requirement slowly. Narrow banking may seem too
radical, with too much reliance on market discipline and perhaps too
much disruption to existing lending relationships.
These fears can be handled through appropriate transition mea-
sures, although I disagree with Pierce that the way to transition is to
provide coinsurance because, in my opinion, coinsurance for large
banks entails a danger of runs. Instead, I would implement the transi-
tion by requiring a gradually increasing portion of the existing loans on
the balance sheets of banks to be transferred to uninsured affiliates. I
would not tamper with the insurance on the right-hand side of the
balance sheet. I would gradually force the banks to move their assets,
other than commercial paper and Treasury bills, to the uninsured
affiliate. This could be done over a five- or ten-year period. That is one
key difference between us.
A second difference is that I am not sure I would impose narrow
banking on small banks. This is purely a political judgment. Small banks
provide a lot of loans to small businesses, and narrow banking would
generate an increase in the cost of funds for small business, perhaps on
the order of 50 basis points. I would take 50 basis points as an acceptable
cost, but politically this may be a problem. If small business wants to go
to small banks, then it should be permitted to go to small banks. I would
not impose narrow banking on small banks. In other words, I would not
mandate it for all banks. I would start out with narrow banking as only
a voluntary requirement, for institutions that want broader powers. The
broader powers would be the benefit associated with converting to a
narrow bank.DISCUSSANT COMMENTS 137
Cross-Guarantees
A final option, cross-guarantees, which Bert Ely can speak to,
deserves discussion. This is another form of private discipline, but by
agents of banks as insurers. This is the notion of, in effect, replacing the
monopolistic Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which is the
current government insurer, with a series of syndicates or private
insurers that would be capitalized by existing banks and also by nonbanks.
Plus, to protect against the possibility of a run on the system, the Fed
would still be there as a backstop source of liquidity for this entire program.
The idea or the motivation here clearly is to provide market discipline by
people who have their money on the line in a way the FDIC does not. You
would essentially break down the monopoly in supervision that you now
have with the FDIC or the bank supervision system at large.
In effect, the proposal for cross-guarantees is designed to break the
regulators’ monopoly as a supervisor. But this option also poses several
problems. First, since the Fed would backstop the system for liquidity
purposes, the syndicates would have to be regulated. This in turn would
probably require an examination of the health of the banks supporting
them. So, you could end up with the existing bank supervision system
backstopping another private supervision system. I am not sure what
would be gained in the end.
And, as a practical matter, the syndicates might force banks to have
higher capital or move to narrow banking. My own experience with
attempting to form a business insuring commercial loans of banks
suggests that private actors are very skittish about insuring lending
portfolios of banks, which they view as blind asset pools. The lesson is
that private people will not willingly insure anybody unless the banks
have a lot more capital and a lot more liquid assets and a lot fewer loans;
in other words, unless they look more like narrow banks. The reality is
that if you end up in a world where you are going to rely on private
insurers, I think it will look very much like the one I have already, in
essence, endorsed, which is a world with higher capital requirements or
narrow banks. This may not be such a bad outcome.
Conclusion
The bottom line is that I would try to combine the proposals of
Benston and Randall. A mandatory requirement of subordinated debt for
large banks is the most practical and realistic proposal for now. I also would
try Randall’s proposal for having regulators attempt to warn of excessive
risk concentrations. Those measures together would give us an improved
system, but I still have a fondness in my heart for my slimmed-down form
of narrow banking, even though it might not be politically palatable now.
As a voluntary quid pro quo for broader powers, it might be, however.R. Alton Gilbert*
We have heard four proposals for changing bank supervision and
regulation. As a discussant of these papers, I now give my opinion on
who won: that is, which speaker made the best case for his proposal.
To juflge the entries, I turn to the assignment for the participants at
this sv~,posium: "The focus of the symposium will be to examine the
lik,~iy effectiveness of various proposals for change in the context of
financial cycles and the role of banking in the economy." With this
focus, the clear winner is Richard Randall. In his proposal, supervisors
would assume authority and responsibility to stop boom and bust cycles
in the operation of the financial system by limiting risk concentrations in
bank portfolios. The contest is not very interesting, however, because
Randall wins by default. The other speakers did not discuss the implica-
tions of their proposals for financial cycles and the role of banking in the
economy, and that is too bad. Advocates for reform proposals should be
expected to discuss all of the important implications of their proposals.
Regulation based on capital requirements or on depositor discipline
may make bank lending procyclical. Problems with credit quality tend to
reduce bank capital when economic activity declines, constraining bank
lending under systems of bank regulation based on capital. Under a
system of regulation that relied on depositor discipline, depositors
would tend to withdraw deposits or require higher risk premiums
during periods of declines in economic activity. These implications of
regulation, whether based on capital requirements or on depositor
discipline, need further exploration.
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Before comparing the proposals, I will mention one way in which
they are similar: Not one emphasized interstate banking or expanded
powers as important safeguards for the banking system. This similarity
is striking, given the importance of interstate banking and expanded
powers in much of the current discussion of banking reform in the
United States. The authors should be asked to defend the assumption,
implicit in their proposals, that their proposed reforms are more
important than interstate banking and expanded powers for safeguard-
ing the future of the banking industry. If they are correct, much of the
emphasis in the current discussion of banking issues in the United
States has the wrong focus.
To make the search for a winner more interesting, let us narrow the
basis for the best proposal to the implications for banking risk. In
comparing the four proposals, it is useful to divide them into two
groups, with the first three papers in one group, the last paper in a
second group. The papers by Randall, Benston, and Rolnick retain at
least some form of deposit insurance for time and savings deposits,
whereas the paper by Pierce calls for restricting deposit insurance to
transactions accounts only. Each of the first three papers has a unique
set of problems, however.
Supervisory Safeguards
First, the problems with Randall’s paper. His assumptions about
the basic cause of the banking risk problem make his paper unique in
this symposium and in the literature on banking risk. The cause is not
moral hazard, created by deposit insurance. Instead, banks are subject
to financial cycles of boom and bust because of the irrational animal
spirits of business people, who get caught up in investment euphoria.
We cannot rely on market participants to discipline the risk assumed by
banks, because all market participants are subject to the same irrational
animal spirits as the bankers. It is the role of bank supervisors, with their
more sober judgment, to stop the cycles of boom and bust by telling
bankers when they are beginning to hold dangerous asset concentra-
tions in their portfolios and by forcing the bankers to change their
lending patterns.
Randall’s world view and his proposal have sweeping policy
implications. According to his view, there is no reason to limit the power
and authority of bank supervisors to banks. Capitalism is unstable;
financial cycles of boom and bust damage the economy. Supervisors
should be given power over all lenders, all forms of financial interme-
diation, in order to impose their more sober judgment. This expanded
supervisory role disturbs me in considering Randall’s proposal, given
the abundant evidence in this country, and around the world, that140 R. Alton Gilbert
market participants do a better job of allocating resources than govern-
ment agents.
Increased Capital Requirements
In his proposal, Benston endorses depositor discipline in principle
but concludes that supervisors will not actually place uninsured depos-
itors at risk. As an alternative to depositor discipline, Benston endorses
higher capital requirements, with subordinated debt included with
equity as capital. Supervisors would enforce capital requirements
through a system of structured early intervention and resolution that
would impose progressively more severe sanctions on banks with lower
capital ratios.
The regulatory scheme for enforcing capital requirements in Ben-
ston’s proposal is similar to the system of prompt corrective actions
mandated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA). Moreover, banks tended to behave as though such
a system was in force even prior to passage of FDICIA.1 The aspect of
Benston’s proposal that is assumed to enhance the effectiveness of
market discipline is the level of the capital requirement necessary to
qualify for minimal supervisory scrutiny: capital (including subordi-
nated debt) equal to at least 10 percent of assets.2 What is missing in
Benston’s proposal is evidence that this proposed threshold for well-
capitalized banks would have the assumed effects on the market
discipline of banks.
Coinsurance
And now the Rolnick proposal: a system of coinsurance, in which
depositors’ insurance coverage would be some fixed percentage of their
deposits. Depositors would have a stake in how a bank invests its assets,
he writes, and banks that held riskier portfolios would have to offer
these depositors a higher rate of return. To accept the Rolnick proposal,
however, it must be assumed that the Fed will always act with the
wisdom and skill necessary to deal with any systemic bank runs. This
assumption makes me uncomfortable.
1 See Gilbert (1991, 1992b, and 1993) and Randall (1993).
2 It is not possible to make a direct comparison between the capital requirement
proposed by Benston and the current capital ratios required of "well capitalized" banks
under FDICIA. Benston’s capital ratio is calculated by summing equity and subordinated
debt, and dividing that sum by total assets. Under FDICIA, as implemented by the federal
bank supervisors, the capital measure that includes at least part of a bank’s subordinated
debt is divided by a risk-weighted measure of total assets.DISCUSSANT COMMENTS 141
Is there a better way? Can we have a safe payments system, with no
risk to the government and no government intervention in the allocation
of credit by the private sector? This question brings us to the Pierce
proposal, which seems to be the solution.
Narrow Banking
Pierce’s proposal falls under the general category commonly called
"narrow banking." Table 1 lists what appear to be the assumptions that
underlie such proposals. The first three assumptions separate the
narrow banking advocates from the laissez-faire banking advocates,
who would have no role for government in regulating banks. Most
criticisms of the narrow banking idea have focused on the fifth assump-
tion. For instance, Randall believes that the government has a vital role
in regulating bank risk-taking. Benston has commented on a loss of
economies of scope in banking under the narrow banking proposals.
I will address the fourth assumption, which I have not seen
discussed by critics of narrow banking proposals. To aid in a discussion
of possible connections between payments services and credit risk, I will
use the balance sheet of a hypothetical monetary service company, as
proposed by Pierce. The company has $100 in transactions deposit
liabilities, which are fully insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (Table 2). Assets of the monetary service company include
$10 in reserves to meet reserve requirements, and $93 in high-quality,
liquid securities, which are marked to market values each day. The
company has some equity to absorb possible changes in the market
value of the securities. It pledges its reserves and securities to the FDIC,
in return for insurance of its deposit liabilities. Full government insur-
ance of the transactions deposits of each monetary service company
Table 1
Assumptions That Underlie Narrow Banking Proposals
1. Fractional reserve banks, with deposits payable on demand, are vulnerable to runs
by depositors.
2. Disruptions in the operation of a nation’s payments system disrupt its economic activity.
3. A valid reason for government regulation of banks is to avoid disruptions in the
operation of the payments system.
4. The government can ensure safe operation of the payments system without assuming
risk by insuring all transactions deposits, but not time and savings deposits, and
requiring collateral against the transactions deposits.
5. These narrow banking restrictions will not diminish the efficiency of intermediation.
Elimination of federal insurance of time and savings deposits and elimination of






Transactions deposits $1 O0
Equity 3
$103
makes the payments system safe, and the value of their assets protects
the deposit insurance fund.
Pierce emphasizes a functional approach to bank regulation, with
regulation focused on the functions of banks that are important for
public policy. I will follow that emphasis by focusing on the functions of
the monetary service companies. Their customers would use their
deposits for making payments, and the companies would process the
payment orders of their customers. Monetary service companies would
need some mechanism for settling for the value of payment orders
cleared among themselves. Banks hold deposits with each other for
purposes of settling the payment orders of the deposit customers.
Monetary service companies would also hold balances with each other,
for the same purpose.
A monetary service company, therefore, could not perform its basic
functions with the balance sheet in Table 2, since it includes no balances
at other banks. Table 3 presents a modified balance sheet, with $10 of
securities shifted to balances due from banks. If the FDIC would permit
the monetary service company to meet its pledging requirements by
pledging its balances due from banks, the FDIC must deal with some
issues in supervising credit risk. If the company holds its balances with
other monetary service companies covered by these narrow banking
restrictions, no credit risk issues would arise. Many banks, however,
hold balances due from foreign banks, which they use in settling foreign
exchange transactions. The monetary service company could suffer a
loss from the failure of one of the foreign banks with which it holds
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to its customers, an important function in the payments system, would
assume some credit risk by holding balances due from foreign banks.
There are ways to protect the FDIC from this credit risk. Perhaps the
management of the monetary service companies could convince the
FDIC that this risk exposure is not a problem, since they hold balances
with the strongest foreign banks, and their capital is more than adequate
to cover any reasonable losses. Such analysis by the FDIC, however,
sounds like traditional bank supervision, and the narrow banking
proposal was supposed to make analysis of credit risk by the supervisors
unnecessary.
Table 4 illustrates another aspect of credit risk assumed by a
monetary service company. The table specifies the balance sheet of the
company by time of day. At the beginning of the day, the balance sheet
is like that in Table 3, except that transactions deposits are divided
between one customer called Big Co., with an opening balance of $5,
and others whose opening balances sum to $95. Given this balance sheet
at the start of the day, the government is protected from losses due to its
insurance of transactions accounts, since the market value of cash plus
securities exceeds the value of transactions deposits.
But now consider the balance sheet at noon. Big Co. has made a
payment of $10 and the monetary service company has a reserve
outflow of $10, leaving the transactions account of Big Co. overdrawn by
$5. Big Co. anticipates an inflow of cash that will make the balance in its
account positive by the end of the day. The monetary service company
allows Big Co. to overdraw its account during the day as a service that
permits Big Co. to hold an end-of-day balance that is small, relative to144 R. Alton Gilbert
the dollar value of transactions that flow through its transactions
account.
Major banks in the United States have developed systems to track
the demand deposit balances of their business customers throughout
the business day, and those customers that the banks consider to have
good credit ratings are permitted to overdraw their demand deposit
accounts during the day, as illustrated for Big Co. in Table 4. Bank credit
officers are actively involved during the business day in determining
which customers may overdraw their accounts, and by how much.
Freedom to temporarily overdraw demand accounts gives customers
greater freedom in cash management than would be available under a
requirement of no intraday credit.
The monetary service company assumes credit risk by allowing Big
Co. to overdraw its demand account at noon. At that time, the sum of
cash and securities ($93) is less than the $95 of transactions balances of
other customers. If Big Co. never repays the $5 overdraft, the monetary
service company fails, and the government loses $2.
One obvious solution would be to forbid customer overdrafts at
monetary service companies. That prohibition, however, would be
almost impossible for the FDIC to enforce. And if, somehow, the FDIC
could enforce a prohibition on overdrafts of customer transactions
deposit accounts, that change would have a major impact on the nature
of business cash management.
Suppose the FDIC concludes that it is not possible or appropriate to
prohibit customer overdrafts at monetary service companies. How can
the FDIC protect itself from exposure to losses? Perhaps the manage-
ment can convince the FDIC that it uses a system that permits overdrafts
only by customers of the highest credit rating, and that its capital is more
than adequate to cover any losses. Such analysis by the FDIC, however,
sounds like traditional bank supervision, and the narrow banking
proposal was supposed to make traditional bank supervision unneces-
sary.
A monetary service company that offers foreign exchange services
would assume credit risk not evident from these balance sheets. I
assume that monetary service companies would engage in foreign
exchange transactions, since foreign exchange is an important aspect of
the payments system, payment from one currency to another. A
company active in the foreign exchange market would have outstanding
transactions to settle tomorrow, the next day, and so on into the future.
If, for some reason, the FDIC took possession of this monetary service
company today, would it make the payments tomorrow that would be
necessary to settle the foreign exchange transactions? I think it would
make those payments, because of its commitment to protecting the
operation of the payments system.
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foreign exchange transactions, and yet the monetary service company
provides no collateral to cover that risk.3 Perhaps the monetary service
company and the FDIC could come to terms on the amount of additional
collateral it would hold to cover the risk inherent in settling foreign
exchange transactions. The company would finance theaddition to
collateral by issuing more capital or uninsured debt. To determine the
appropriate amount of additional capital, the FDIC would assess the
nature of management practices in conducting foreign exchange trans-
actions and choosing counterparties. This, however, sounds like tradi-
tional bank supervision, and the narrow banking proposal was sup-
posed to eliminate the need for traditional bank supervision.
Conclusion
This analysis eliminates Pierce’s proposal as a winner, since it does
not deliver what was promised: It does not protect the payments
system, eliminate government risk, and eliminate the need for supervi-
sion by government agents of the credit risk assumed by banks. This
leaves me again with the first three candidates as possible winners. The
options are as follows:
(1) Greater authority and responsibility for bank supervisors to use
their judgment in dealing with banking risk (Randall proposal);
(2) A system for the enforcement of capital requirements that is not
much different from what we have now (Benston proposal); and
(3) Coinsurance (the Rolnick proposal).
My chosen winner among these options is the coinsurance proposal.
That proposal would enhance market discipline of banks, because it
would change the options of supervisors in ways that make a complete
bailout of the uninsured depositors of large banks less likely. If super-
visors have to choose between liquidation of one of our largest banks,
under the current limits on deposit insurance coverage, and a bailout of
uninsured depositors, the supervisors will tend to choose the bailout.
Liquidation would be too disruptive. Closing a bank with a high
percentage of all deposit accounts covered by deposit insurance would
be less disruptive to the banking system than liquidation under current
limits on coverage. Coinsurance changes the options of supervisors in a
way that makes the choice of the bailout less likely.
3 See Gilbert (1992a) for an analysis of the risk assumed by banks in settling foreign
exchange transactions.146 R. Alton Gilbert
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